RFC 2137:Secure Domain Name System Dynamic Update
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RR


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... update can specify complex combinations of deletion and insertion (with or without pre-existence testing) of resource records (RRs) with one or more owner names; however, all testing and changes for any particular DNS ...
... DNS as SIG resource records (RRs). A SIG RR ...
... resource records (RRs). A SIG RR provides a digital signature on the set of all RRs ...
... RR provides a digital signature on the set of all RRs with the same owner name and class as the SIG ...
... the SIG. The SIG RR cryptographically binds the covered RR set to the signer ...
... SIG. The SIG RR cryptographically binds the covered RR set to the signer, time signed, signature ...
... public keys in the DNS via KEY RRs. These KEY RRs are also, of course, authenticated by SIG ...
... DNS via KEY RRs. These KEY RRs are also, of course, authenticated by SIG ...
... authenticated by SIG RRs. KEY RRs for zones are stored in their superzone and subzone servers, if any, so that the secure DNS ...
... SIG RRs. KEY RRs for zones are stored in their superzone and subzone servers, if any, so that the secure DNS tree ...


... secure zone is any secure DNS zone containing one or more KEY RRs that can authorize dynamic updates, i.e., entity or user KEY ...
... dynamic updates, i.e., entity or user KEY RRs with the signatory field non-zero, and whose zone KEY RR ...
... RRs with the signatory field non-zero, and whose zone KEY RR signatory field indicates that updates are implemented. There are two basic modes of dynamic secure zone ...
... As a consequence, any dynamicly added or changed RRs are signed in the secure zone by their authorizing dynamic update ...
... dynamic update key and they are backed up, along with this SIG RR, in a separate online dynamic master file. In this type of zone, server computation is minimized since the server need only check signatures ...
... SIG and NXT RRs which covers the zone under the zone key will not cover dynamically added data. Thus, for type A dynamic secure zones ...
... transfer security is not automatically provided for dynamically added RRs, where they could be omitted, and authentication is not provided for the server denial of the existence of a dynamically added type. ...
... authentication is not provided for the server denial of the existence of a dynamically added type. Because the dynamicly added RRs retain their update KEY signed SIG, ...
... finer grained control of updates can be implemented via bits in the KEY RR signatory field. Because dynamic data is only stored in the online dynamic master file and only authenticated by dynamic keys ...
... SIG and thus always protected during zone transfers and will be included in NXT RRs so that it can be falsely denied by a server only to the same extent that static data can (i.e., if it is within a wild card scope). Because the zone key ...
... is used to sign all the zone data, the information as to who originated the current state of dynamic RR sets is lost, making unavailable the effects of some of the update ...
... update control bits in the KEY RR signatory field. In addition, the incorporation of the updates into the primary master file and their authentication by the zone key ...


... The scope of authority of such keys is indicated by their KEY RR owner name, class, and signatory field flags as described below. In ...
... owner name, class, and signatory field flags as described below. In addition, such KEY RRs must be entity or user keys and not have the authentication ...
... The owner name of any update authorizing KEY RR must (1) be the same as the owner name of any RRs being added or deleted ...
... update authorizing KEY RR must (1) be the same as the owner name of any RRs being added or deleted or (2) a wildcard ...
... wildcard name including within its extended scope (see section 3.3) the name of any RRs being added or deleted and those RRs must be in the same ...
... of any RRs being added or deleted and those RRs must be in the same zone. ...
... The class of any update authorizing KEY RR must be the same as the class of any RR ...
... RR must be the same as the class of any RR's being added or deleted. ...
... 2065(-> 2535(-> 4035prop | 4034prop | 4033prop))) of any update authorizing KEY RR must be non-zero. The bits have the meanings ...
... UPDATE KEY RR SIGNATORY FIELD BITS ...
... NS, glue A, and zone KEY RR(s). If zero, the key can not authorize any update that would effect such RRs ...
... RR(s). If zero, the key can not authorize any update that would effect such RRs. This bit is meaningful for both type A and type B dynamic secure zones ...
... update - If nonzero, this key is authorized to add and delete RRs even if there are other RRs with the same owner name and class ...
... delete RRs even if there are other RRs with the same owner name and class that are authenticated ...
... different dynamic update KEY. If zero, the key can only authorize updates where any existing RRs of the same owner and class are authenticated ...
... Keeping this bit zero on multiple KEY RRs with the same or nested wild card owner names permits multiple entities to exist ...
... that can create and delete names but can not effect RRs with different owner names from any they created. In effect, this ...
... update - If nonzero, this key is authorized to add and update RRs for only a single owner name. If there already exist RRs with one or more names signed by this key, they may be ...
... update RRs for only a single owner name. If there already exist RRs with one or more names signed by this key, they may be updated but no new name created until the number of existing ...
... new names. In conjunction with a local administratively imposed limit on the number of dynamic RRs with a particular name, it can completely restrict a KEY from flooding a zone with RRs ...
... RRs with a particular name, it can completely restrict a KEY from flooding a zone with RRs. Bit ...
... ZONE KEY RR SIGNATORY FIELD BITS ...
... If there are multiple dynamic update KEY RRs for a zone and zone policy is in transition, they might have different non-zero signatory ...
... dynamic update, it would be necessary to first create a copy of the KEY RR with this name, because otherwise the existence of the more specific name would hide the authorizing KEY RR and would ...
... copy of the KEY RR with this name, because otherwise the existence of the more specific name would hide the authorizing KEY RR and would make later updates impossible. An updater could create such a KEY RR ...
... RR and would make later updates impossible. An updater could create such a KEY RR but could not zone sign it with their authorizing signer. They would ...
... wildcard name as signer. Thus in creating, for example, one hundred type A RRs authorized by a *.1.1.1.in-addr.arpa. KEY RR, without key punch through 100 As, 100 ...
... Thus in creating, for example, one hundred type A RRs authorized by a *.1.1.1.in-addr.arpa. KEY RR, without key punch through 100 As, 100 KEYs, and 200 SIGs would have to be created as opposed to merely 100 ...


... DNS header, including opcode, counts, etc., as well as the data. Data signatures, on the other hand, appear only among the RRs to be added and are only required for mode A operation. These two types of signatures ...
... class) and must prove this by appending request SIG RRs under each such key. ...
... 2065(-> 2535(-> 4035prop | 4034prop | 4033prop)), a request signature is a SIG RR occurring at the end of a request with a type covered field of zero. For an update ...
... update requester provide SIG RRs that will authenticate the after update state ...
... authenticate the after update state of all RR sets that are changed by the update and are non-empty after the update ...
... update. These SIG RRs appear in the request as RRs to be added and the request must delete ...
... These SIG RRs appear in the request as RRs to be added and the request must delete any previous data SIG ...
... request must delete any previous data SIG RRs that are invalidated by the request. ...
... zone key SIG RRs. In this case, data signatures need not be included with the update ...
... bits of the zone KEY RR (see section 3.2). ...


... re-signing of the zone SOA resource record (RR) to increase the SOA serial number. This means that compromise of the primary server host ...
... Isolation of dynamic RRs to separate zones from those holding most static RRs can limit the damage that could occur from breach of a ...
... Isolation of dynamic RRs to separate zones from those holding most static RRs can limit the damage that could occur from breach of a dynamic zone's security. ...



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