RFC 2137:Secure Domain Name System Dynamic Update
RFC-Ref

update


Click on the red underlined text to get to the source

... Dynamic update operations have been defined for the Domain Name System (DNS) in RFC 2136prop ...
... RFC1035] is assumed. Familiarity with the DNS security and dynamic update proposals will be helpful. ...
... Overview of DNS Dynamic Update ...
... DNS dynamic update defines a new DNS opcode, new DNS request and response ...
... request and response structure if that opcode is used, and new error codes. An update can specify complex combinations of deletion and insertion (with or without pre-existence testing) of resource records (RRs ...
... with one or more owner names; however, all testing and changes for any particular DNS update request are restricted to a single zone. Updates occur at the primary server for a zone. ...
... The primary server for a secure dynamic zone must increment the zone SOA serial number when an update occurs or the next time the SOA is retrieved if one or more updates have occurred since the previous SOA retrieval and the updates themselves did not update ...
... update occurs or the next time the SOA is retrieved if one or more updates have occurred since the previous SOA retrieval and the updates themselves did not update the SOA. ...
... the secure zone is signed either by a zone key or by a dynamic update key tracing its authority to a zone key ...
... Request SIGs are the primary means of authenticating update requests. ...


... signatory field indicates that updates are implemented. There are two basic modes of dynamic secure zone which relate to the update strategy, mode A and mode B. A summary comparison table is given ...
... RRs are signed in the secure zone by their authorizing dynamic update key and they are backed up, along with this SIG RR ...
... master file. In this type of zone, server computation is minimized since the server need only check signatures on the update data and request, which have already been signed by the updater, generally a much faster operation than signing ...
... for the server denial of the existence of a dynamically added type. Because the dynamicly added RRs retain their update KEY signed SIG, finer grained control of updates can be implemented via bits ...
... authority for manual transfer to the off line static master file. NOTE: for this mode the zone SOA must be signed by a dynamic update key and that private key must be kept on line so that the SOA can be ...
... AXFR SIG may be recalculated for each update or on demand when a zone transfer is requested and it is out of date.) ...
... RR sets is lost, making unavailable the effects of some of the update control bits in the KEY RR ...
... zone key on-line also means that dynamic update keys which are signed by the zone key can be dynamically updated since the zone key ...
... validation and performance of update requests. It has no effect on retrievals. One reasonable operational scheme may be to keep a mostly static main zone operating in Mode A and have one or more dynamic subzones ...


... Dynamic update requests depend on update keys as described in section 3.1 below. In addition, the zone secure dynamic update ...
... Dynamic update requests depend on update keys as described in section 3.1 below. In addition, the zone secure dynamic update mode and ...
... Dynamic update requests depend on update keys as described in section 3.1 below. In addition, the zone secure dynamic update mode and availability of some options is indicated in the zone key. Finally, ...
... Update Keys ...
... All update requests to a secure zone must include signatures by one ...
... secure zone must include signatures by one or more key(s) that together can authorize that update. In order for the Domain Name System (DNS ...
... authentication use prohibited bit on. All parts of the actual update must be within the scope of at least one of the keys used for a request SIG ...
... must be within the scope of at least one of the keys used for a request SIG on the update request as described in section 4. ...
... Update Key Name Scope ...
... The owner name of any update authorizing KEY RR must (1) be the same as the owner name of any RRs ...
... Update Key Class Scope ...
... The class of any update authorizing KEY RR must be the same as the class ...
... Update Key Signatory Field ...
... The four bit "signatory field" (see RFC 2065(-> 2535(-> 4035prop | 4034prop | 4033prop))) of any update authorizing KEY RR must be non-zero ...
... UPDATE KEY RR SIGNATORY FIELD BITS ...
... zone KEY RR(s). If zero, the key can not authorize any update that would effect such RRs. This bit ...
... Bit 1, strong update - If nonzero, this key is authorized to add and delete RRs ...
... authenticated by a SIG signed with a different dynamic update KEY. If zero, the key can only authorize updates where any existing RRs of the same owner and ...
... created. In effect, this creates two levels of dynamic update key, strong and weak, where weak keys are limited in interfering with each other but a ...
... Bit 2, unique name update - If nonzero, this key is authorized to add and update RRs ...
... Bit 2, unique name update - If nonzero, this key is authorized to add and update RRs for only a single owner name. If there already exist RRs ...
... is meaningful only if the owner name is a wildcard. (Any dynamic update KEY with a non-wildcard name is, in effect, a unique name update ...
... dynamic update KEY with a non-wildcard name is, in effect, a unique name update key.) This bit ...
... Bit 3, general update - The general update signatory field bit has no ...
... Bit 3, general update - The general update signatory field bit has no special meaning. If the other three bits ...
... be one so that the field is non-zero to designate that the key is an update key. The meaning of all values of the signatory field with the general bit and one or more other signatory field ...
... All the signatory bit update authorizations described above only apply if the update ...
... update authorizations described above only apply if the update is within the name and class scope as per sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2. ...
... Zone Keys and Update Modes ...
... zone keys, the signatory field bits have different means than they they do for update keys, as shown below. The signatory field MUST be zero if dynamic update is not supported for a zone and MUST ...
... they they do for update keys, as shown below. The signatory field MUST be zero if dynamic update is not supported for a zone and MUST be non-zero if it is. ...
... Bit 0, mode - This bit indicates the update mode for this zone. Zero indicates mode A while a one indicates mode B. ...
... Bit 1, strong update - If nonzero, this indicates that the "strong" key feature described in section 3.1.3 above is implemented and ...
... enabled for this secure zone. If zero, the feature is not available. Has no effect if the zone is a mode B secure update zone. ...
... Bit 2, unique name update - If nonzero, this indicates that the "unique name" feature described in section 3.1.3 above is implemented and enabled for this secure zone ...
... secure zone. If zero, this feature is not available. Has no effect if the zone is a mode B secure update zone. Bit ...
... Bit 3, general - This bit has no special meeting. If dynamic update for a zone is supported and the other bits in the zone key ...
... If there are multiple dynamic update KEY RRs for a zone and zone policy is in transition, they might have different non-zero ...
... A server that will be executing update operations on a zone, that is, the primary master server, MUST not advertize a zone key that will ...
... Just as a zone key is valid throughout the entire zone, update keys with wildcard names are valid ...
... wildcard scope was created by dynamic update, it would be necessary to first create a copy of the KEY RR ...


... Update Signatures ...
... Update Request Signatures ...
... An update can effect multiple owner names in a zone. It may be that these different names are covered by different dynamic update keys. ...
... An update can effect multiple owner names in a zone. It may be that these different names are covered by different dynamic update keys. For every owner name effected, the updater must know a private key ...
... RR occurring at the end of a request with a type covered field of zero. For an update, request signatures occur in the Additional information section. Each request SIG ...
... Update Data Signatures ...
... Mode A dynamic secure zones require that the update requester provide SIG RRs ...
... SIG RRs that will authenticate the after update state of all RR sets ...
... state of all RR sets that are changed by the update and are non-empty after the update. These SIG ...
... RR sets that are changed by the update and are non-empty after the update. These SIG RRs ...
... RRs. In this case, data signatures need not be included with the update. A resolver can determine which mode an updatable secure zone is using by examining the signatory field bits ...


... secure zone maintained off line as recommended in RFC 2065(-> 2535(-> 4035prop | 4034prop | 4033prop)). If nothing else, secure dynamic update requires on line change to and re-signing of the zone SOA resource record ...


... Dynamic Updates in the Domain Name System (DNS UPDATE)", RFC 2136prop, April 1997. ...



Google
Web
RFC-Ref