RFC 2267:Network Ingress Filtering: De...
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attack


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... A resurgence of Denial of Service Attacks [1] aimed at various targets ...
... network security communities to find new and innovative methods to mitigate these types of attacks. The difficulties in reaching this goal are numerous; some simple tools ...
... tools already exist to limit the effectiveness and scope of these attacks, but they have not been widely implemented. This method ...
... This method of attack has been known for some time. Defending against it, however, has been an ongoing concern. Bill Cheswick is quoted in [2 ...
... 3], at the last minute because there was no way for an administrator of the system under attack to effectively defend the system. By mentioning the method, he was concerned about ...
... filtering method discussed in this document does absolutely nothing to protect against flooding attacks which originate from valid prefixes ...
... prefixes (IP addresses), it will prohibit an attacker within the originating network from launching an attack of ...
... attacker within the originating network from launching an attack of this nature using forged source addresses that do not conform to ...
... urged to implement filtering described in this document to prohibit attackers from using forged source addresses which do not reside within a range ...
... filtering is that it enables the originator to be easily traced to it's true source, since the attacker would have to use a valid, and legitimately reachable, source address ...


... router <--- Internet <----- router <-- attacker TCP ...
... host" is the targeted machine. o The attacker resides within the "valid" prefix, 9.0.0.0/8. ...
... prefix, 9.0.0.0/8. o The attacker launches the attack using randomly changing source addresses; in this example, the source addresses ...
... o The attacker launches the attack using randomly changing source addresses; in this example, the source addresses are depicted as ...
... routing tables, and therefore, unreachable. However, any unreachable prefix could be used to perpetrate this attack method. ...
... which appears in the global routing table(s). For example, an attacker using a valid network address ...
... network address could wreak havoc by making the attack appear to come from an organization which did not, in fact, originate the attack and was completely innocent. In such ...
... the attack appear to come from an organization which did not, in fact, originate the attack and was completely innocent. In such cases, the administrator of a system under attack ...
... attack and was completely innocent. In such cases, the administrator of a system under attack may be inclined to filter all traffic ...
... filter all traffic coming from the apparent attack source. Adding such a filter would then result in a denial of service ...
... legitimate, non-hostile end-systems. In this case, the administrator of the system under attack unwittingly becomes an accomplice of the attacker. ...
... of the system under attack unwittingly becomes an accomplice of the attacker. Further complicating matters, TCP SYN ...
... Further complicating matters, TCP SYN flood attacks will result in SYN-ACK ...
... ACK packets being sent to one or many hosts which have no involvement in the attack, but which become secondary victims. This allows the attacker to abuse two or more systems at once. ...
... involvement in the attack, but which become secondary victims. This allows the attacker to abuse two or more systems at once. Similar attacks ...
... attacker to abuse two or more systems at once. Similar attacks have been attempted using UDP and ICMP flooding ...
... ICMP flooding. The former attack (UDP flooding) uses forged packets to try and ...
... for system diagnostic ports from outside of their administrative domain to reach their systems. The latter attack (ICMP flooding), ...
... broadcast replication mechanics. This attack relies on a router serving a large multi- access broadcast ...
... When an TCP SYN attack is launched using unreachable source address, the target host ...
... the target host attempts to reserve resources waiting for a response. The attacker repeatedly changes the bogus source address on each new packet sent, thus exhausting additional host resources ...
... host resources. Alternatively, if the attacker uses someone else's valid host ...
... address as the source address, the system under attack will send a large number of SYN/ACK ...
... of the connection establishment sequence. In this fashion, the attacker does damage to two systems: the destination target system, ...
... routing system. The result of both attack methods is extremely degraded performance, ...
... vendors have modified their software to allow the targeted servers to sustain attacks with very high connection attempt rates. This is a welcome and necessary part of the solution to the problem. Ingress filtering ...


... The problems encountered with this type of attack are numerous, and involve shortcomings in host software implementations, routing ...
... source address spoofing can be virtually eliminated in this attack scenario. 11.0.0.0/8 ...
... ISP <--- ISP <-- router <-- attacker A B C D 2 / ...
... 12.0.0.0/8 In the example above, the attacker resides within 9.0.0.0/8, which is provided Internet connectivity by ISP ...
... link of "router 2", which provides connectivity to the attacker's network, restricts traffic to allow only traffic ...
... source addresses within the 9.0.0.0/8 prefix, and prohibits an attacker from using "invalid" source addresses which reside outside of this prefix ...


... source address spoofing, it does not preclude an attacker using a forged source address of another host within the ...
... filter range. It does, however, ensure that when an attack of this nature does indeed occur, a network administrator can be sure that the attack ...
... attack of this nature does indeed occur, a network administrator can be sure that the attack is actually originating from within the known prefixes that are being advertised. This simplifies tracking down the ...


... source address spoofing denial of service attacks. Network service providers and administrators ...
... service providers do so as soon as possible. In addition to aiding the Internet community as a whole to defeat this attack method, it can also assist service providers ...
... method, it can also assist service providers in locating the source of the attack if service providers can categorically demonstrate that their network ...
... The filtering could also, in practice, block a disgruntled employee from anonymous attacks. It is the responsibility of all network administrators ...
... It is the responsibility of all network administrators to ensure they do not become the unwitting source of an attack of this nature. ...


... network administrators implement ingress filtering, the opportunity for an attacker to use forged source addresses as an attack methodology will ...
... attacker to use forged source addresses as an attack methodology will significantly lessen. Tracking the source of an attack is simplified ...
... source addresses as an attack methodology will significantly lessen. Tracking the source of an attack is simplified when the source is more likely to be "valid ...
... when the source is more likely to be "valid." By reducing the number and frequency of attacks in the Internet as a whole, there will be more resources for tracking the attacks ...
... attacks in the Internet as a whole, there will be more resources for tracking the attacks which ultimately do occur. ...


... Flooding and IP Spoofing Attacks; September 24, 1996. ...



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