certificate
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This document specifies a protocol useful in determining the current
status of a digital certificate without requiring CRLs. Additional
mechanisms addressing PKIX operational requirements ...
... may be necessary to obtain timely information regarding the
revocation status of a certificate (cf. [RFC2459], Section 3.3).
Examples include high-value funds transfer or large stock trades.
...
...
The Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) enables applications to
determine the (revocation ...
... determine the (revocation) state of an identified certificate. OCSP
may be used to satisfy some of the operational requirements ...
... OCSP responder and suspends
acceptance of the certificate in question until the responder
provides a response.
...
...
This protocol specifies the data that needs to be exchanged between
an application checking the status of a certificate and the server
providing that status.
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... the CA who issued the certificate in question ...
... Responder (Authorized Responder) who holds a
specially marked certificate issued directly by the CA, indicating
that the responder ...
... responses for each of the certificates in a request ...
...
The response for each of the certificates in a request consists of
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... certificate status value ...
...
This specification defines the following definitive response
indicators for use in the certificate status value:
...
... positive response to the status inquiry.
At a minimum, this positive response indicates that the certificate
is not revoked, but does not necessarily mean that the certificate
...
... positive response indicates that the certificate
is not revoked, but does not necessarily mean that the certificate
was ever issued or that the time at which the response was produced
is within the certificate ...
... certificate
was ever issued or that the time at which the response was produced
is within the certificate's validity interval. Response extensions
may be used to convey additional information on assertions made by
...
... may be used to convey additional information on assertions made by
the responder regarding the status of the certificate such as
positive statement about issuance, validity, etc.
...
...
The "revoked" state indicates that the certificate has been revoked
(either permanantly or temporarily (on hold)).
...
... OCSP responder is operational, but unable to
return a status for the requested certificate, the "tryLater"
response can be used to indicate that the service exists, but is
...
... to be correct
- nextUpdate: The time at or before which newer information will be
available about the status of the certificate
- producedAt: The time at which the OCSP responder ...
... OCSP responders MAY pre-produce signed responses specifying the
status of certificates at a specified time. The time at which the
status was known to be correct SHALL be reflected in the thisUpdate
field of the response. The time at or before which newer information
...
...
The key that signs a certificate's status information need not be the
same key that signed the certificate. A certificate ...
... The key that signs a certificate's status information need not be the
same key that signed the certificate. A certificate's issuer
...
... certificate's status information need not be the
same key that signed the certificate. A certificate's issuer
explicitly delegates OCSP ...
... OCSP signing authority by issuing a certificate
containing a unique value for extendedKeyUsage in the OCSP signer ...
... signer's
certificate. This certificate MUST be issued directly to the
responder by the cognizant CA ...
... Certificate Content ...
... AuthorityInfoAccess extension (defined in [RFC2459], section 4.2.2.1)
in certificates that can be checked using OCSP. Alternatively, the
accessLocation for the OCSP ...
...
The value of the accessLocation field in the subject certificate
defines the transport (e.g. HTTP ...
... The certificate identified in a received response corresponds to
that which was identified in the corresponding request;
...
... When available, the time at or before which newer information will
be available about the status of the certificate (nextUpdate) is
greater than the current time.
...
... encoding of the issuer's name
field in the certificate being checked. issuerKeyHash is the hash of
the Issuer ...
... public key field in the
issuer's certificate. The hash algorithm used for both these hashes,
...
... is signed, the requestor SHALL specify its name in the requestorName
field. Also, for signed requests, the requestor MAY include
certificates that help the OCSP responder verify the requestor's
...
...
The key that signs a certificate's status information need not be the
same key that signed the certificate. It is necessary however to
...
... The key that signs a certificate's status information need not be the
same key that signed the certificate. It is necessary however to
ensure that the entity signing ...
... entity signing this information is authorized to do
so. Therefore, a certificate's issuer MUST either sign the OCSP
responses itself or it MUST explicitly designate this authority ...
... signing delegation SHALL be designated by the
inclusion of id-kp-OCSPSigning in an extendedKeyUsage certificate
extension included in the OCSP response signer's certificate ...
... certificate
extension included in the OCSP response signer's certificate. This
certificate MUST be issued directly by the CA ...
... signer's certificate. This
certificate MUST be issued directly by the CA that issued the
certificate ...
... signing authority is trusted. They MUST reject the
response if the certificate required to validate the signature on the
...
... Includes a value of id-ad-ocspSigning in an ExtendedKeyUsage
extension and is issued by the CA that issued the certificate in
question."
...
...
Additional acceptance or rejection criteria may apply to either the
response itself or to the certificate used to validate the signature
...
... clients need to know how to check that an
authorized responder's certificate has not been revoked. CAs may
choose to deal with this problem in one of three ways:
...
... lifetime of the responder's certificate. The CA does so by including
the extension id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck. This SHOULD be a non-critical ...
... extension. The value of the extension should be NULL. CAs issuing
such a certificate should realized that a compromise of the
responder's key, is as serious as the compromise of a CA key ...
... sign CRLs, at least for the validity period of this certificate. CA's
may choose to issue this type of certificate ...
... certificate. CA's
may choose to issue this type of certificate with a very short
lifetime and renew it frequently.
...
... A CA may specify how the responder's certificate be checked for
revocation. This can be done using CRL ...
... revocation checking
for the responder's certificate, in which case, it would be up to the
OCSP client ...
... client's local security policy to decide whether that
certificate should be checked for revocation or not.
...
... model employed in X.509 version 3 certificates see [RFC2459]. Support
for all extensions is optional for both clients ...
... responder to indicate the CRL on
which a revoked or onHold certificate is found. This can be useful
where OCSP is used between repositories, and also as an auditing
...
... responder MAY choose to retain revocation information beyond
a certificate's expiration. The date obtained by subtracting this
retention interval value from the producedAt time in a response is
defined as the certificate ...
... certificate's expiration. The date obtained by subtracting this
retention interval value from the producedAt time in a response is
defined as the certificate's "archive cutoff" date.
...
... contribute to a proof that a digital signature was (or was not)
reliable on the date it was produced even if the certificate needed
to validate the signature ...
... a request and routes it to the OCSP server which is known to be
authoritative for the identified certificate. The serviceLocator
request extension is defined for this purpose. This extension is
...
... Values for these fields are obtained from the corresponding fields in
the subject certificate.
...
...
For this service to be effective, certificate using systems must
connect to the certificate status service provider ...
... service to be effective, certificate using systems must
connect to the certificate status service provider. In the event such
a connection ...
... service provider. In the event such
a connection cannot be obtained, certificate-using systems could
implement CRL processing logic as a fall-back ...
... replay attacks in which an
old (good) response is replayed prior to its expiration date but
after the certificate has been revoked. Deployments of OCSP should
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... Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and CRL Profile", RFC 2459(-> 3280prop) ...
... Framework (X.509)
Certificate, AlgorithmIdentifier, CRLReason
FROM AuthenticationFramework { joint-iso-itu-t ds(5)
module(1) authenticationFramework(7) 3 }
...
...
-- PKIX Certificate Extensions
AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax
FROM PKIX1Implicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
...
... signature BIT STRING,
certs [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL }
ResponseData ::= SEQUENCE {
...