ICANN
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... 1] has been heavily discussed and referenced in the last
year or two, especially in discussions within ICANN and its
predecessors about the creation, delegation, and management ...
... management of top-
level domains. In particular, the ICANN Domain Name Supporting
Organization (DNSO), and especially its ccTLD constituency, have been
...
... traditional, "public service", in-country, ccTLDs about excessive
ICANN interference and fears of being forced to conform to
internationally-set policies for dispute resolution when their
...
... to time for other international TLDs of this variety, e.g., for
medical entities such as physicians and hospitals and for museums.
ICANN has recently approved several TLDs of this type and
describes them as "sponsored" TLDs.
...
... that no two-letter TLDs be created except from that list (in order to
avoid future conflicts). ICANN should control the allocation and
delegation of TLDs using these, and other, criteria, but only
...
... If we had adopted this type of three-way categorization and could
make it work, I believe it would have presented several opportunities
for ICANN and the community more generally to reduce controversies
and move forward. Of course, there will be cases where the
categorization of a particular domain ...
... categorization of a particular domain and its operating style will
not be completely clear-cut (see section 3, below). But having ICANN
work out procedures for dealing with those (probably few) situations
appears preferable to strategies that would tend to propel ICANN ...
... ICANN
work out procedures for dealing with those (probably few) situations
appears preferable to strategies that would tend to propel ICANN into
areas that are beyond its competence or that might require
significant expansion of its mandate.
...
...
First, the internally-operated ccTLDs (category iii above) should not
be required to have much interaction with ICANN or vice versa. Once
a domain of this sort is established and delegated, and assuming that
...
... the "admin contact in the country" rule is strictly observed, the
domain should be able to function effectively without ICANN
intervention or oversight. In particular, while a country might
choose to adopt the general ICANN ...
... ICANN
intervention or oversight. In particular, while a country might
choose to adopt the general ICANN policies about dispute resolution
or name management ...
... well be dealt with exclusively under applicable national laws. If a
domain chooses to use ICANN services that cost resources to provide,
it should contribute to ICANN ...
... ICANN services that cost resources to provide,
it should contribute to ICANN's support, but, if it does not, ICANN
should not presume to charge it for other than a reasonable fraction
...
... services that cost resources to provide,
it should contribute to ICANN's support, but, if it does not, ICANN
should not presume to charge it for other than a reasonable fraction
of the costs to ICANN ...
... ICANN
should not presume to charge it for other than a reasonable fraction
of the costs to ICANN of operating the root, root servers, and any
...
... domains ought to be treated
as generic domains. ICANN dispute resolution and name management
...
...
One (fairly non-intrusive) rule ICANN might well impose on all top-
level domains is that they identify and publish the policies they
...
...
ICANN (and IANA) should, as described above, have as little
involvement as possible in the direction of true country [code]
...
... these domains should be subject to ICANN regulation beyond the basic
principles of 1591 and associated arrangements needed to ensure
Internet ...
...
ICANN's avoiding such involvement strengthens it: the desirability of
avoiding collisions with national sovereignty, determinations about
government legitimacy, and the authority ...
... list (technically internal to the 3166 maintenance activity, and not
part of the Standard): since IANA (or ICANN) can ask that a name be
placed on that list, there is no rule of an absolute determination by
an external organization. Purported countries can come to ICANN ...
... ICANN) can ask that a name be
placed on that list, there is no rule of an absolute determination by
an external organization. Purported countries can come to ICANN,
insist on having delegations made and persuade ICANN ...
... ICANN,
insist on having delegations made and persuade ICANN to ask that the
names be reserved. Then, since the reserved name would exist, they
could insist that the domain ...
... another organization to request reservation of the name by 3166/MA;
once it was reserved, ICANN might be hard-pressed not to do the
delegation. Of course, ICANN ...
... ICANN might be hard-pressed not to do the
delegation. Of course, ICANN could (and probably would be forced to)
adopt additional criteria other than appearance on the "reserved
list" in order to delegate such domains ...
... effectively than any IANA evaluation of, e.g., whether the letterhead
on a request looked authentic (and far more safely for ICANN than
asking the opinion of any particular other government or selection of
governments).
...
... not be made lightly. At the same time, if a government wishes to
make a change, the best mechanism for doing so is not to involve
ICANN in a potential determination of legitimacy (or even to have
ICANN's Government Advisory Committee ...
... ICANN in a potential determination of legitimacy (or even to have
ICANN's Government Advisory Committee (GAC) try to formally make that
decision for individual countries) but for the relevant government to
...
... Implications for the current ICANN DNSO structure. ...
... The arguments by some of the ccTLD administrators that they are
different from the rest of the ICANN and DNSO structures are (in this
model) correct: they are different. The ccTLDs that are operating as
generic TLDs should be separated from the ccTLD constituency and
...
... generic TLDs should be separated from the ccTLD constituency and
joined to the gTLD constituency. The country ccTLDs should be
separated from ICANN's immediate Supporting Organization structure,
and operate in a parallel and advisory capacity to ICANN, similar to
...
... separated from ICANN's immediate Supporting Organization structure,
and operate in a parallel and advisory capacity to ICANN, similar to
the arrangements used with the GAC. The DNSO and country TLDs should
not be required to interact with each other except on a mutually
...
... the arrangements used with the GAC. The DNSO and country TLDs should
not be required to interact with each other except on a mutually
voluntary basis and, if ICANN needs interaction or advice from some
of all of those TLDs, it would be more appropriate to get it in the
form of an advisory body like the GAC rather than as DNSO
...