RFC 4366:Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions
RFC-Ref

hash


Click on the red underlined text to get to the source

... during the TLS handshake MUST be included in the hash calculations involved in "Finished" messages. ...
... struct { CertChainType type; URLAndOptionalHash url_and_hash_list<1..2^16-1>; } CertificateURL; ...
... opaque url<1..2^16-1>; Boolean hash_present; select (hash_present) { ...
... Boolean hash_present; select (hash_present) { case false: struct {}; case true: SHA1Hash; ...
... case false: struct {}; case true: SHA1Hash; } hash; } URLAndOptionalHash; ...
... opaque SHA1Hash[20]; Here "url_and_hash_list" contains a sequence of URLs and optional hashes ...
... hash_list" contains a sequence of URLs and optional hashes. When X.509 certificates ...
... ordering. The hash corresponding to each URL at the client's discretion either ...
... URL at the client's discretion either is not present or is the SHA-1 hash of the certificate or certificate chain (in the case of X.509 certificates ...
... certificate chain as usual. A cached copy of the content of any URL in the chain MAY be used, provided that a SHA-1 hash is present for that URL and it matches the hash ...
... SHA-1 hash is present for that URL and it matches the hash of the cached copy. Servers that support this extension MUST support the http: URL scheme ...
... "application/pkix-pkipath" (see Section 8). If a SHA-1 hash is present for an URL, then the server MUST check that the SHA-1 hash ...
... SHA-1 hash is present for an URL, then the server MUST check that the SHA-1 hash of the contents of the object retrieved from that URL (after decoding any MIME Content ...
... MIME Content-Transfer-Encoding) matches the given hash. If any retrieved object does not have the correct SHA-1 hash, the server MUST abort the handshake with a ...
... Transfer-Encoding) matches the given hash. If any retrieved object does not have the correct SHA-1 hash, the server MUST abort the handshake with a "bad_certificate ...
... handshake with a "bad_certificate_hash_value" alert. ...
... identifier_type) { case pre_agreed: struct {}; case key_sha1_hash: SHA1Hash; case x509_name: DistinguishedName; ...
... case x509_name: DistinguishedName; case cert_sha1_hash: SHA1Hash; } identifier; ...
... enum { pre_agreed(0), key_sha1_hash(1), x509_name(2), cert_sha1_hash(3), (255) ...
... pre_agreed(0), key_sha1_hash(1), x509_name(2), cert_sha1_hash(3), (255) } IdentifierType; ...
... identity supplied. - "key_sha1_hash": contains the SHA-1 hash of the CA root key. For ...
... - "key_sha1_hash": contains the SHA-1 hash of the CA root key. For Digital Signature ...
... DSA) and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) keys, this is the hash of the "subjectPublicKey" value. For RSA keys, the hash ...
... hash of the "subjectPublicKey" value. For RSA keys, the hash is of the big- endian byte string representation of the modulus without any ...
... endian byte string representation of the modulus without any initial 0-valued bytes. (This copies the key hash formats deployed in other environments.) ...
... CA. - "cert_sha1_hash": contains the SHA-1 hash of a DER-encoded ...
... - "cert_sha1_hash": contains the SHA-1 hash of a DER-encoded Certificate ...
... they possess in this extension. Note also that it is possible that a key hash or a Distinguished Name alone may not uniquely identify a certificate ...
... record layer communications. In TLS, the entire output of the hash function is used as the MAC tag ...
... tag. However, it may be desirable in constrained environments to save bandwidth by truncating the output of the hash function to 80 bits when forming MAC tags ...
... HMACs, calculated as specified in [HMAC]. That is, CipherSpec.hash_size is 10 bytes, and only the first 10 bytes of the HMAC output are transmitted and ...


... - "bad_certificate_hash_value": this alert is sent by servers when a certificate ...
... alert is sent by servers when a certificate hash does not match a client-provided certificate ...
... client-provided certificate_hash. This message is always fatal. These error alerts ...
... certificate_status_response(113), /* new */ bad_certificate_hash_value(114), /* new */ (255) } AlertDescription; ...


... extension fields are included in the inputs to the Finished message hashes will be sufficient, but extreme care is needed when the extension changes the meaning of messages sent in the handshake ...


... clients should include certificate hashes when they send certificate URLs. ...
... client certificate chain is covered by the Finished message hashes. The purpose of including hashes and checking them against the retrieved certificate chain ...
... Finished message hashes. The purpose of including hashes and checking them against the retrieved certificate chain is to ensure that the same property holds when this extension is used, ...
... On the other hand, omitting certificate hashes enables functionality that is desirable in some circumstances; for example, clients can be ...
... Clients that choose to omit certificate hashes should be aware of the possibility of an attack in which the attacker ...
... TLS uses both MD5 and SHA-1 hashes in several other places, this was not believed to be necessary here. The property required of SHA-1 ...
... The use of the SHA-1 certificate hash alternative ensures that each certificate is specified unambiguously. As for the previous ...
... MD5 and SHA-1 hashes. ...
... messages that affect extension parameters have been authenticated by the hashes in the Finished messages, it is not possible for an active attacker to force negotiation ...



Google
Web
RFC-Ref