RFC 4366:Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions
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session


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... version; Random random; SessionID session_id; CipherSuite cipher_suites<2..2^16-1>; ...
... version; Random random; SessionID session_id; CipherSuite cipher_suite; ...
... client hello may be sent both when starting a new session and when requesting session resumption. Indeed, a client ...
... starting a new session and when requesting session resumption. Indeed, a client that requests resumption of a session ...
... session resumption. Indeed, a client that requests resumption of a session does not in general know whether the server will accept this request, and therefore it SHOULD send an extended client hello ...
... therefore it SHOULD send an extended client hello if it would normally do so for a new session. In general the specification of each extension type must include a discussion of the effect of the ...
... each extension type must include a discussion of the effect of the extension both during new sessions and during resumed sessions. ...
... discussion of the effect of the extension both during new sessions and during resumed sessions. ...


... Note also that all the extensions defined in this section are relevant only when a session is initiated. When a client includes one or more of the defined extension types in an extended client hello ...
... client includes one or more of the defined extension types in an extended client hello while requesting session resumption: - If the resumption request is denied, the use of the extensions is ...
... negotiated as normal. - If, on the other hand, the older session is resumed, then the server MUST ignore the extensions and send a server hello ...
... containing none of the extension types. In this case, the functionality of these extensions negotiated during the original session initiation is applied to the resumed session. ...
... functionality of these extensions negotiated during the original session initiation is applied to the resumed session. Section 3.1 describes the extension of TLS ...
... application protocol. If the server_name is established in the TLS session handshake, the client SHOULD NOT ...
... messages. The negotiated length applies for the duration of the session including session resumptions. ...
... The negotiated length applies for the duration of the session including session resumptions. The negotiated length limits the input that the record layer ...
... new cipher suites are added that do not use HMAC, and the session negotiates one of these cipher suites, this extension will have no effect. It is strongly recommended that any new cipher suites ...
... other negotiated security parameters. Subsequently during the session, clients and servers MUST use truncated HMACs, calculated as ...
... The negotiated HMAC truncation size applies for the duration of the session including session resumptions. ...
... HMAC truncation size applies for the duration of the session including session resumptions. ...


... TLS, a single failed MAC guess will cause the immediate termination of the TLS session. Since the MAC algorithm ...
... truncated HMAC in the future, if either the client or the server for a given session were updated to take the problem into account, it would be able to veto use of this extension. ...



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