RFC 4891:Using IPsec to Secure IPv6-in-IPv4 Tunnel...
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address


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... optional extensions. This document does not address the use of IPsec for tunnels that are ...


... [RFC4213] is mostly concerned about address spoofing threats: ...
... 1. The IPv4 source address of the encapsulating ("outer") packet can be spoofed. ...
... 2. The IPv6 source address of the encapsulated ("inner") packet can be spoofed. ...
... ingress filtering. [RFC4213] specifies the following strict address checks as mitigating measures: o To mitigate threat (1), the decapsulator ...
... decapsulator verifies that the IPv4 source address of the packet is the same as the address of the configured tunnel ...
... IPv4 source address of the packet is the same as the address of the configured tunnel endpoint ...
... o To mitigate threat (2), the decapsulator verifies whether the inner IPv6 address is a valid IPv6 address and also applies IPv6 ...
... inner IPv6 address is a valid IPv6 address and also applies IPv6 ingress filtering ...
... SA is bound to the IPv4 source address. This prevents threat (1) but not threat (2). IPsec ...
... transport mode does not verify the contents of the payload itself where the IPv6 addresses are carried. That is, two nodes using IPsec transport mode ...
... endpoint. The outer IPv4 addresses may be spoofed, and IPsec cannot detect this in tunnel mode ...
... tunnel mode; the packets will be demultiplexed based on the SPI and possibly the IPv6 address bound to the SA. Thus, the outer address ...
... IPv6 address bound to the SA. Thus, the outer address spoofing is irrelevant as long as the decryption succeeds and ...


... IPv6 packet takes. The source and destination addresses of the IPv6 packets traversing the tunnel ...
... IPv6 prefixes, so binding IPv6 addresses to be used to the SA is not generally feasible. IPv6 ...
... IPv6 ingress filtering must be performed to mitigate the IPv6 address spoofing threat. ...
... The hosts in the site originate the packets with IPv6 source addresses coming from a well-known prefix, whereas the destination addresses ...
... source addresses coming from a well-known prefix, whereas the destination addresses could be any nodes on the Internet. ...
... router at Site B, and Router A could verify that the source address of the packet matches the prefix. Site B will not be able to do a similar verification ...
... In this case, the source and the destination IPv6 addresses are known a priori. A tunnel mode SA could be bound to these specific ...
... a priori. A tunnel mode SA could be bound to these specific addresses. Address verification prevents IPv6 ...
... tunnel mode SA could be bound to these specific addresses. Address verification prevents IPv6 source address ...
... Address verification prevents IPv6 source address spoofing completely. ...


... 2. IKEv2 supports dynamic address configuration, which may be used to configure the IPv6 address of the host ...
... IKEv2 supports dynamic address configuration, which may be used to configure the IPv6 address of the host. ...
... host. Network Address Translation (NAT) traversal works with both the old and revised IPsec ...


... 2. In router-to-router tunnels, the source and destination addresses of the traffic could come from a wide range ...
... RFC3884]. This mainly affects scenario (1). 3. Source address selection depends on the notions of routes and interfaces. This implies that the reachability ...
... The third requirement is also problematic, because almost all implementations assume addresses are assigned on interfaces (rather than configured in SPDs ...
... interfaces (rather than configured in SPDs) for proper source address selection. If the IPsec tunnel mode ...
... routers, Router1 and Router2, with tunnel endpoint IPv4 addresses denoted IPV4-TEP1 and IPV4 ...
... Identity of the peer asserted in the IKEv2 exchange: Many different types of identities can be used. At least, the IPv4 address of the peer should be supported. o IKEv2 ...
... o The child SA authorization data should contain the IPv4 address of the peer. ...
... the peer. IPv4 address should be supported as Identity during the key exchange. ...


... applied to a tunnel interface. Source address spoofing can be limited by enabling ingress filtering ...


... tunnel by spoofing the source address (data plane security), or if the tunnel is signaled ...


... Aboba, B. and W. Dixon, "IPsec-Network Address Translation (NAT) Compatibility Requirements ...


... interface is created and used with "any" addresses ("::/0 <-> ::/0" ) as IPsec traffic ...
... tunnel interface as the IPsec policy checks do not check the IPv6 addresses at all. Routing protocols, multicast, etc. will work ...
... interface for all IPsec traffic), there is no Duplicate Address Detection (DAD), Multicast Listener Discovery (MLD ...
... SPD entries assume that there are two hosts, Host1 and Host2, whose IPv6 addresses are denoted IPV6-EP1 and IPV6-EP2 (global ...
... IPV6-EP1 and IPV6-EP2 (global addresses), and the IPV4 addresses of the tunnel endpoints are ...
... IPV6-EP2 (global addresses), and the IPV4 addresses of the tunnel endpoints are denoted IPV4 ...
... The following SPD entries assume that the host has the IPv6 address IPV6-EP1 and the tunnel endpoints ...
... SUBNET as their phase 2 identities. The starting address is zero and the end address is all ones for ID_IPV6 ...
... identities. The starting address is zero and the end address is all ones for ID_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE ...
... IPV6_ADDR_RANGE. The starting address is zero IP address and the end address ...
... RANGE. The starting address is zero IP address and the end address is all zeroes for ID_IPV6 ...
... address is zero IP address and the end address is all zeroes for ID_IPV6_ADDR_SUBNET. With ...


... B.1. Dynamic Address Configuration ...
... host in the host-to-router scenario to obtain an IPv6 address from the ISP as part of setting up ...
... Network address (and port) translation devices are commonly found in today's networks ...
... 2. Using NAT traversal allows the outer address to change without having to renegotiate the SAs. This could be beneficial for a ...
... crude form of mobility and in scenarios where the NAT changes the IP addresses frequently. However, as the outer address may change, this might introduce new security issues ...
... NAT changes the IP addresses frequently. However, as the outer address may change, this might introduce new security issues, and using ...
... In particular, using manually configured tunneling is an operational challenge with dynamic IP addresses, because both ends need to be reconfigured if an address changes. Therefore, an easy and efficient ...
... challenge with dynamic IP addresses, because both ends need to be reconfigured if an address changes. Therefore, an easy and efficient way to re-establish the IPsec tunnel ...
... way to re-establish the IPsec tunnel if the IP address changes would be desirable. MOBIKE [RFC4555 ...
... The IKEv2 initiator needs to know the address of the IKEv2 responder ...
... o Using a pre-configured or pre-determined IPv4 anycast address. o Using other, unspecified or proprietary methods ...
... methods. For the purpose of this document, it is assumed that this address can be obtained somehow. Once the address has been learned, it is ...
... For the purpose of this document, it is assumed that this address can be obtained somehow. Once the address has been learned, it is configured as the tunnel endpoint for the configured IPv6-in-IPv4 ...
... endpoint discovery provides benefit only if PAD information is chosen in such a manner that it is not IP-address specific. ...


... Authors' Addresses ...


... copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at ietf-ipr@ietf.org. ...



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