RFC 4891:Using IPsec to Secure IPv6-in-IPv4 Tunnel...
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interface


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... tunnel path is out of scope. The use of the word "interface" or the phrase "IP interface" refers to the IPv6 ...
... The use of the word "interface" or the phrase "IP interface" refers to the IPv6 interface ...
... IP interface" refers to the IPv6 interface that must be present on any IPv6 node to send or receive IPv6 packets ...
... or receive IPv6 packets. The use of the phrase "tunnel interface" refers to the interface that receives the IPv6-in-IPv4 ...
... tunnel interface" refers to the interface that receives the IPv6-in-IPv4 tunneled packets over IPv4 ...


... IPv4 ingress filtering, i.e., check whether the packet is received on a legitimate interface. o To mitigate threat (2), the decapsulator ...
... This shortcoming can be partially mitigated by IPv6 ingress filtering, i.e., check that the packet is arriving from the interface in the direction of the route towards the tunnel endpoint ...
... ingress filtering can be applied in the tunnel interface. (Transport mode is often also used in other kinds of tunnels ...
... applying transport mode to a tunnel interface, and as a result this document recommends transport mode. Note that even though transport ...


... 3. Source address selection depends on the notions of routes and interfaces. This implies that the reachability to the various IPv6 ...
... or may not model the IPsec tunnel mode SA as an interface as described in Appendix A.1. ...
... If IPsec tunnel mode SA is not modeled as an interface (e.g., as of this writing, popular in many open source implementations), the SPD ...
... requirement is also problematic, because almost all implementations assume addresses are assigned on interfaces (rather than configured in SPDs) for proper source address ...
... If the IPsec tunnel mode SA is modeled as interface, the traffic that needs protection can be modeled as routes pointing to the interface ...
... interface, the traffic that needs protection can be modeled as routes pointing to the interface. But the second requirement is difficult to satisfy, because the ...
... requirement is easily solved, because IPsec is modeled as an interface. In practice, (2) has been solved by protecting all the traffic ...
... IPv6 ingress filtering must be applied on the tunnel interface on all the packets that pass the inbound IPsec processing. ...


... observe that applying transport mode to a tunnel interface is the simplest and therefore recommended solution. ...
... transport mode applied to a tunnel interface. Source address spoofing can be ...
... limited by enabling ingress filtering on the tunnel interface. Manual keying must not be used as large amounts of IPv6 ...


... SPD (SSPD) model (without a tunnel interface) can be made to work, but it has reduced applicability, and the use of a transport mode tunnel ...
... SPDs": some implementations model the tunnel mode SA as an IP interface. In this case, an IPsec tunnel interface ...
... IP interface. In this case, an IPsec tunnel interface is created and used with "any" addresses ...
... Ingress filtering must be separately applied on the tunnel interface as the IPsec policy checks do not check the IPv6 addresses at all. Routing protocols ...
... transport mode. The SPDs must be interface-specific. However, because IKE uses IPv4 ...
... IPv6, there is no standard solution to map the IPv4 interface to IPv6 interface [VLINK ...
... IPv4 interface to IPv6 interface [VLINK] and this approach is not feasible. ...
... 2. "Specific SPDs": some implementations do not model the tunnel mode SA as an IP interface. Traffic selection is based on specific SPD ...
... session between two endpoints does not have an interface (though an implementation may have a common pseudo-interface ...
... interface (though an implementation may have a common pseudo-interface for all IPsec traffic), there is no Duplicate Address Detection ...



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