RFC 4891:Using IPsec to Secure IPv6-in-IPv4 Tunnel...
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SA


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... IPsec and assumptions made by this document for successful IPsec Security Association (SA) establishment. Section 5 gives the details of Internet Key Exchange ...


... Authentication Header (AH) security association (SA) is established to protect the traffic defined by (IPv4 ...
... Security Parameter Index (SPI) and the inbound selectors associated with the SA to verify that the packet is appropriate for the SA via which it was received. A successful verification ...
... associated with the SA to verify that the packet is appropriate for the SA via which it was received. A successful verification implies that the packet came from the right IPv4 ...
... that the packet came from the right IPv4 endpoint, because the SA is bound to the IPv4 source address ...
... In most implementations, a transport mode SA is applied to a normal IPv6-in-IPv4 tunnel ...
... In tunnel mode, the IPsec SA is established to protect the traffic defined by (IPv6 ...
... ESP) and then matches the packet against the SPI and the inbound selectors associated with the SA to verify that the packet is appropriate for the SA via which it was received. The successful ...
... selectors associated with the SA to verify that the packet is appropriate for the SA via which it was received. The successful verification implies that the packet came from the right endpoint ...
... SPI and possibly the IPv6 address bound to the SA. Thus, the outer address spoofing ...


... binding IPv6 addresses to be used to the SA is not generally feasible. IPv6 ingress filtering ...
... In this case, an IPsec tunnel mode SA could be bound to the prefix that was allocated to the router ...
... destination IPv6 addresses are known a priori. A tunnel mode SA could be bound to these specific addresses. Address ...


... in traffic selectors when an IPsec SA is negotiated. In contrast, [RFC4301] requires supporting IP ...
... traffic selectors for a given IPsec SA in [RFC4301]. This is possible only with IKEv2 ...
... possible only with IKEv2. If IKEv1 is used, then multiple SAs need to be set up, one for each traffic selector. ...


... SPD entries for setting up the IPsec transport mode SA to protect the IPv6 traffic. ...
... tunnel mode as implementations may or may not model the IPsec tunnel mode SA as an interface as described in Appendix A.1. ...
... If IPsec tunnel mode SA is not modeled as an interface (e.g., as of this writing, popular in many open source implementations), the SPD ...
... If the IPsec tunnel mode SA is modeled as interface, the traffic that ...
... it interoperates with a larger number of implementations. o The child SA authorization data should contain the IPv4 address of the peer. ...


... IKEv2 must be used for establishing the IPsec SAs. IKEv2 should be used where supported and available; if not, IKEv1 ...


... 1. "Generic SPDs": some implementations model the tunnel mode SA as an IP interface. In this case, an IPsec ...
... traffic selectors while setting up the SA. Though this allows all traffic between the two nodes ...
... 2. "Specific SPDs": some implementations do not model the tunnel mode SA as an IP interface. Traffic selection is based on ...


... setting up the IPsec tunnel mode SA. The details of these procedures are out of scope for this memo. ...
... IP payloads in the initial IKE_SA_INIT exchange. Once a NAT is detected and both endpoints ...
... NAT traversal allows the outer address to change without having to renegotiate the SAs. This could be beneficial for a crude form of mobility and in scenarios where the NAT changes the ...



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